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TRUTH-IN-LENDING: SOME ASPECTS
Elwin J. Griffith*
Although the Truth-in-Lending Act has made considerable
progress in attaining meaningful disclosure of credit terms to
consumers, various difficulties in interpreting the Act remain.
Many of these difficulties are the product of a technical statute
while others are due to conflicting judicial decisions. In this
article, the author focuses on several aspects of Truth-in-
Lending that have created problems for the courts. In conclu-
sion, he suggests that Congress should resolve these problems
and ambiguities by an amendment to the Truth-in-Lending
Act.
INTRODUCTION
The Truth-in-Lending Act' was enacted in 1968 "to assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer
[would] be able to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit."'
In the last few years consumers have been provided with much
more information about credit terms than they were accustomed
to before Truth-in-Lending. In determining what disclosures are
required, creditors have endured with remarkable fortitude the
trials and tribulations of the Act and the ensuing Regulation Z.1
Sometimes the creditors' zeal has caused them to disclose too
much. In such cases, they have run the risk of obscuring the basic
information required under the Act and the Regulation. The pre-
vailing error attributable to most violators, however, has been the
tendency to disclose too little information or to vary somewhat
from the statutory labels.'
* Associate Dean, University of Cincinnati Law School; B.A., Long Island University;
J.D., Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., (International Law) New York University.
1. 15 U.S.C.A. H§1601-66 (1974 & Supp. II 1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
2. 15 U.S.C.A. §1601 (Supp. 111976).
3. 12 C.F.R. §226.1-.1002 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Regulation]. The Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [hereinafter referred to as the Board] is
authorized to issue regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act. 15 U.S.C. §1604 (1970
& Supp. IV 1974).
4. The creditor must use specific terms in disclosing the required information. For
example, in loans and other non-sale credit he must disclose the "amount financed," and
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One problem area is disclosure of the provision granting the
creditor the right to accelerate in the event of the debtor's default.
That provision usually is contained in the note or the credit agree-
ment. The question is whether it should also be contained in the
disclosure statement required under the Regulation.' The Act and
the Regulation call for disclosure of any "default, delinquency, or
similar charges payable in the event of late payments."6 Thus,
whether acceleration comes within the ambit of the disclosure
requirements depends on the possibility of categorizing it as a
charge. Therefore, it should be instructive to review the judicial
interpretations of the disclosure requirements concerning the
creditor's right to accelerate.
Another aspect of Truth-in-Lending that has generated fre-
quent litigation is the problem of security interests affecting
after-acquired property. The Regulation requires that if after-
acquired property will be covered by the security interest, that
fact shall be clearly stated in conjunction with the description or
identification of the type of security interest.' Frequently, a credi-
tor's documents will apply the security interest to all consumer
goods subsequently acquired by the debtor. However, the submis-
sion of all the debtor's consumer goods to the security interest is
limited by section 9-204 of the Uniform Commercial Code' which
prohibits the attachment of the security interest to after-acquired
consumer goods unless the goods are acquired within ten days
after the creditor gives value. Thus, we shall examine the effect
the "finance charge" as an "annual percentage rate." 12 C.F.R. §§226.8(a),(d) (1976). A
variation from these terms is usually regarded as a violation.
5. The disclosures required in credit transactions other than open-end transactions
must be made together on either:
(1) The note or other instrument evidencing the obligation on the same side
of the page and above the place for the customer's signature; or
(2) One side of a separate statement which identifies the transaction.
12 C.F.R. §226.8(a) (1976).
The problem concerning the acceleration provision arises when the creditor makes his
disclosures on a separate statement but does not include acceleration.
6. 15 U.S.C.A. §1638(a)(9) (1974); 12 C.F.R. §226.8(b)(4) (1976).
7. 12 C.F.R. §226.8(b)(5) (1976).
8. U.C.C. §9-204(2) (1972) provides as follows:
No security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause to con-
sumer goods other than accessions (Section 9-314).when given as additional
security unless the debtor acquires rights in them within ten days after the
secured party gives value.
1977]
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of this state law limitation on security interests in after-acquired
consumer goods.
In addition, some consideration is given to cases in which credi-
tors have failed to comply with the Regulation and have asserted
that such failure resulted from a bona fide error and was uninten-
tional.9 Even the most conscientious debtors frequently have been
perplexed about the application of this good faith defense. Our
consideration of this aspect will be restricted primarily to the
definition of intent and the type of errors protected. In conclu-
sion, a brief review will be made of the nature of the civil remedy
available to a debtor in case of a creditor's violation'0 and the
procedural problems that have arisen as a result of an ambigu-
ously worded statute.
ACCELERATION AS A CHARGE
The Truth-in-Lending Act requires certain disclosures in the
case of sales or consumer loans not under open-end credit plans."
Under the Act a creditor must disclose "the default, delinquency,
or similar charges payable in the event of late payments."' 2 Sec-
tion 226.8(b)(4) of Regulation Z requires a disclosure of "the
amount, or method of computing the amount, or any default,
delinquency, or similar charges payable in the event of late pay-
ments.' 1 3 Thus, the pivotal question is whether acceleration is a
charge that must be disclosed under the Act and the Regulation."
One of the first cases to deal with this question was Garza v.
Chicago Health Clubs, Inc. ,"5 in which the district court held that
9. 15 U.S.C.A. §1640(c),(f) (Supp. II 1976).
10. 15 U.S.C.A. §1640(a) (Supp. 111976).
11. "Open end credit" means consumer credit extended on an account pursuant to a
plan under which (1) the creditor may permit the consumer to make purchases or obtain
loans, from time to time, directly from the creditor or indirectly by use of a credit card,
check, or other device, as the plan may provide; (2) the customer has the privilege of
paying the balance in full or in installments; and (3) a finance charge may be computed
by the creditor from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance. The term does not
include negotiated advances under an open end real estate mortgage or a letter of credit.
12 C.F.R. §226.2(r). Id. at §226.203 (open-ended credit distinguished from other types
of credit).
12. 15 U.S.C.A. §1638(a)(9) (1974) (emphasis added).
13. 12 C.F.R. §226.8(b)(4) (1976) (emphasis added).
14. If acceleration is a charge, it must be disclosed in the separate disclosure statement
that the creditor furnishes to the debtor.
15. 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. I1. 1972).
[Vol. 26:566
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the acceleration clause must be disclosed because it is a charge.
The court noted the general definition of a charge as an obliga-
tion" and its judicial definition as a pecuniary burden. 7 Combin-
ing these definitions with the general purpose of the Act, the court
decided in favor of disclosure. 8
Subsequently, the Federal Reserve Board issued an opinion
which classified an acceleration as a prepayment of the loan as
opposed to a charge, and held that the disclosure requirements
of section 226.8(b)(7) of Regulation Z were applicable. Section
226.8(b) (7) requires creditors to identify the method of computing
any unearned portion of the finance charge that will be refunded
if a loan is prepaid." The Board's opinion letter, therefore, intro-
duced an additional consideration because it equated accelera-
tion of the debt with voluntary prepayment and imposed the
same disclosure requirements in both cases. The Board's ap-
proach suggested that if there were a rebate of unearned finance
charges computed in the same manner as rebates because of vol-
untary prepayment, there were no additional charges payable
and therefore the acceleration provision would not have to be
disclosed under section 226.8(b)(4) as a "similar charge." How-
ever, if the acceleration provision utilized a different method of
computing the unearned finance charge, it would have to be dis-
closed under section 226.8(b)(7) as if acceleration were a volun-
tary prepayment. It is submitted here, and my subsequent dis-
cussion will suggest, that the Board's characterization of acceler-
ation as voluntary prepayment was incorrect.
The problem surfaced again in Johnson v. McCrackin-
Spurman Ford, Inc.2 ' In Johnson, the disclosure statement did
16. Id. at 959, citing Black's Law Dictionary 294 (4th ed. 1951).
17. Id., citing Sunderland v. Day, 12 Ill.2d 50 (1957).
18. Another case, Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. (D. Ore. 1975), bolstered
the Garza opinion by holding in favor of such disclosure in order to sustain the
"meaningful disclosure" standards of the Act. Id. at 16. Although the court did not
categorize acceleration as a charge, it took the view that acceleration was within the type
of information that must be disclosed under the spirit of the Act.
19. Fed. Res. Bd. Staff Opinion Letter No. 851, Oct. 22, 1974, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) §31,173.
20. 12 C.F.R. §226.8(b)(7) (1976). Unearned interest may be included in the unearned
portion of the finance charge because the creditor has received loan interest for a period
after the loan has already been paid off.
21. 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975).
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not contain the acceleration provision, nor did it expressly pro-
vide for a rebate of the unearned finance charges in the event of
acceleration. However, under Pennsylvania law, the creditor
could demand only the outstanding principal and earned interest
in the event of acceleration.22 The Third Circuit treated the Penn-
sylvania statutory provision governing rebate as part of the con-
tract.2 3 Thus, the creditor would have to rebate any unearned
finance charge upon acceleration. The court noted that the credi-
tor had complied with section 226.8(b)(7) of Regulation Z, which
called for a disclosure of the method used by the creditor in com-
puting the unearned finance charge, by disclosing the rebate
method applicable in the event of prepayment.24 Citing the
Board's opinion letter, the court characterized acceleration as a
form of prepayment. It then concluded that the creditor had ful-
filled the disclosure requirements when it disclosed the method
of rebate for prepayment as provided in section 226.8(b)(7).15
While the disclosure statement in Johnson granted the debtor
a prepayment privilege, 6 the default provision of the contract
gave the seller the right to accelerate the debt, along with other
22. Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act §22(B), 69 PA. CONS. STAT. §622 (B)
(1965).
23. 527 F.2d at 268. The debtor contended that the Pennsylvania statute was irrelevant
in determining whether Truth-in-Lending was violated by the omission of the acceleration
clause. This argument was sustained in Barrett v. Vernie Jones Ford, Inc., 395 F. Supp.
904 (N.D. Ga. 1975). The court felt that once the creditor asserted the right to collect a
charge, it should not matter for purposes of Regulation Z disclosure whether he could
legally collect that charge. The Johnson court treated the Pennsylvania statute as part of
the contract and regarded the rebate as mandatory. 527 F.2d at 268. In Termplan Mid-
City, Inc. v. Laughlin, 333 So.2d 738 (La. App. 1976), the contract specifically incorpo-
rated Louisiana law which provided for rebate of unearned interest in acceleration. The
court held that disclosure of the acceleration clause was not required because there was
no charge under section 226.8(b)(4).
24. 527 F.2d at 261, 266 nn. 4 & 5.
25. Id. at 268-69. One of the specific disclosures required in credit other than open-end
is as follows:
Identification of the method of computing any unearned portion of the
finance charge in the event of prepayment in full of an obligation which includes
precomputed finance charges and a statement of the amount or method of
computation of any charge that may be deducted from the amount of any rebate
of such unearned finance charge that will be credited to an obligation or re-
funded to the customer. If the credit contract does not provide for any rebate of
unearned finance charges upon prepayment in full, this fact shall be disclosed.
12 C.F.R. §226.8(b)(7) (1976).
26. 527 F.2d at 261 n.5.
[Vol. 26:566
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remedies. 7 The default provision contemplated a procedure initi-
ated and controlled by the creditor to protect his security with the
ultimate objective of satisfying his debt. Surely the event con-
templated by the default provision did not approximate the vol-
untary payment described in the disclosure statement." The pre-
payment provision accommodated a true prepayment because it
gave the buyer the option of prepaying his obligations. It is diffi-
cult, therefore, to understand how acceleration could be viewed
as a prepayment in light of the remedial nature of the default
provision.
It is interesting that in providing for rebate of the unearned
finance charge, the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance
Act mentioned other events besides prepayment. The rebate was
required if the balance was liquidated by "prepayment, refinanc-
ing or termination by surrender or repossession and resale of the
motor vehicle. . ". ."I It is arguable that this statute recognized
a difference between voluntary prepayment and acts occurring as
a result of the debtor's default. If the court in Johnson regarded
the state's rebate provision as a term of the acceleration clause,
it should have noticed the statute's distinction between prepay-
ment and liquidation occurring through repossession and resale.
Such repossession action follows the creditor's acceleration and
when the debt has been thus satisfied, it can hardly be said that
the buyer had prepaid his debt. The author believes that the
reliance by the Johnson court on the Board's opinion letter was
misplaced and that it should have held that acceleration was
neither a charge nor a prepayment.
One does not usually think of prepayment as an act dictated
by the creditor because of the debtor's default. Accordingly, sec-
tion 226.8(b)(6) requires the description of any penalty charge
that may be assessed against the debtor by the creditor in the
event of prepayment. 0 The penalty envisaged by section
27. Id. at 261. It confirmed his recourse to repossession through self-help and restated
his preferred status as a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code. The buyer
agreed to pay all reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses involved in collecting the
debt or reselling the security.
28. Id.
29. 69 PA. CONS. STAT. §622(B) (1965).
30. 12 C.F.R. §226.8(b)(6) (1976) provides for the disclosure as follows:
A description of any penalty charge that may be imposed by the creditor or his
19771
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226.8(b)(6) is one usually imposed by the creditor incident to
acceptance of the principal in advance of the maturity date.',
After all, in a mortgage transaction the creditor is not obligated
to accept payment of the debt until the date agreed upon in the
documents because the essence of his bargain may have involved
the investment of a certain sum for a specific period. 2 In consid-
eration of his decision to compromise that agreement, the creditor
may insist on an additional penalty payment as stipulated in the
contract. Such a sum is a substitute device for the interest yield
for which he contracted and which now vanishes because of the
premature payment. Therefore, in the absence of evidence to sug-
gest a contrary reading, the term "prepayment" should be ac-
corded the same interpretation in both subsections (6) and (7).
It is also submitted that the classification of acceleration as a
charge is incorrect. The burden flowing from the exercise of a
right of acceleration indeed may be worthy of disclosure. How-
ever, the question is not whether the right imposes a burden, but
rather whether it may result in the imposition of a default or
delinquency charge. There is a meaningful distinction between
the right of acceleration and the imposition of a charge pursuant
to the exercise of that right.3" The acceleration provision by itself
simply details a remedy available to the creditor in the event of
the debtor's default. If there is a refund of the unearned finance
assignee for prepayment of the principal of the obligation (such as a real estate
mortgage) with an explanation of the method of computation of such penalty
and the conditions under which it may be imposed.
31. See 12 C.F.R. §226.818 (1976) in which the Board interprets section 226.8(b)(6) as
applying to transactions such as real estate mortgages in which the interest is computed
on the unpaid balance, and section 226.8(b)(7) as applying to transactions involving
precomputed finance charges which are included in the face amount of the obligation.
32. The draftsmen had this in mind because the Conference Report stated that the
Federal Reserve Board and other regulatory agencies should provide for the
disclosure to the obligor at the time of the completion of a consumer credit
transaction of any prepayment penalties in connection with real estate mort-
gages ....
H.R. REP. No. 1397, 90TH CONG., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2023.
33. If it is true that there is no charge on acceleration because no additional sum is
imposed, then that should hold true even in the absence of a rebate provision.
34. It must be noted that acceleration may occur because of a default having nothing
to do with a late payment. Thus an impairment of collateral could be an event of default.
See, e.g., Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 26:566
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charge, the debtor has not incurred any default or delinquency
charges as a result of the acceleration.
It must be recalled that section 226.8(b)(4) deals only with
"default, delinquency, or similar charges payable in the event of
late payments." If acceleration is regarded as synonymous with
prepayment pursuant to the Board's view, there is some difficulty
in regarding the retained unearned finance charges as a "charge"
under section 226.8(b)(4). The assessment of a charge because of
a late payment presumes to some extent the continued existence
of the obligation. 5 Although the average creditor does not invite
the debtor's delinquency, he usually provides for that contin-
gency by setting a late charge." A charge may be imposed, there-
fore, because the creditor has decided to accept a payment after
its due date, not because he has decided to accelerate the obliga-
tion. 7 As a matter of fact, the imposition of the charge is not at
all related to the question of acceleration. The creditor may de-
cide to accept the late payment together with the appropriate late
charge or he may decide to accelerate the total debt because of
recurring delinquencies. 8 Thus, the Board's categorization of the
amounts retained by the creditor beyond those which would be
rebated under the disclosed provisions is not accurate since the
unearned finance charges arise not as a result of a late payment,
but as a result of the creditor's acceleration of the debt.
Would an acceleration under such circumstances be a charge? Even if it could be so
considered, it would not be imposed because of a late payment. This further weakens the
argument that acceleration is a charge within section 226.8(b)(4).
35. See Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975); Hous-
ton v. Atlanta Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) §98553.
36. 1 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) §4230 explains it this way: "Delinquency charges-like
deferral charges-are the compensation a creditor receives on a precomputed contract for
the debtor's delay in making timely installment payments." See also CURRAN, TRENDS IN
CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 71-72 (1965).
37. If the creditor collects a charge for a late payment, it must be one that is similar to
a default or delinquency charge; i.e., a specific sum. But additionally, if acceleration
occurs, the creditor is in effect engaging in an act other than accepting the debtor's late
payment. That act of acceleration may even be instigated by an event of default totally
unrelated to a delinquent payment. Is it, therefore, a charge as contemplated by section
226.8(b)(4)? The term "charge" must be taken in the context of a similarity to default or
delinquency charges and must arise as incident to a late payment. How can acceleration
be included within the term "similar charges" if the creditor does not receive compensa-
tion in addition to that for which the debtor is originally obligated?
38. See Martin v. Comm. Sec. Co., 539 F.2d 521, 528 (5th Cir. 1976); Mirabal v. Gen.
Motors Accept. Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 884.85 (7th Cir. 1976).
19771
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Even if it is conceded that acceleration of a debt creates a
charge, that event does not come within the coverage of section
226.8(b)(4). A default, delinquency, or similar charge can be as-
sessed after late payment without acceleration and, therefore,
there must be a distinction contemplated by the Act and the
Regulation by restricting the condition to the event of late pay-
ment.39 If it is desirable to inform the consumer of the possibility
that the creditor will retain unearned finance charges on accelera-
tion, then the language of the Act and the Regulation would have
to be amended to provide for the disclosure of "any default, delin-
quency, or similar charges payable in the event of late payments
or unearned finance charges to be retained in the event of acceler-
ation."40
While the Johnson court held that the right of acceleration was
not a "default, delinquency or similar charge," that decision was
based essentially on an incorporation of the Pennsylvania statute
that the unearned finance charge must be rebated in the event
there is acceleration." That case did not answer the question
concerning the requirement of disclosing acceleration in the ab-
sence of a provision rebating unearned finance charges upon ac-
celeration.
However, in Martin v. Commercial Securities, Co.,' 2 the Fifth
Circuit did confront that issue and concluded that the Act re-
ferred only to charges imposed as a result of the late payment of
an installment, not imposed because of acceleration. In Martin,
the disclosure statement informed the debtor about charges paya-
ble in the event of late payments. In addition, it contained a
39. The "late payment" aspect is usually obscured in the cases by attempts to show
acceleration as a charge. But even if it is a charge, it must occur in the event of late
payment.
40. This language is suggested because the controversy surrounding acceleration has
been about unearned finance charges. Therefore, that item must be somehow isolated
from the present language dealing with "default, delinquency or similar charges."
See also St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 413 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii 1976) (acceleration
treated as a "subsequent occurrence" under section 226.6(g) of Regulation Z and, there-
fore, not subject to disclosure at all).
41. 527 F.2d at 265.
42. 539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976); accord, Smith v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 545 F.2d 242
(5th Cir. 1976); Whittlesey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 542 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1976); Grant
v. Imperial Motors, 539 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1976); Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc.,
539 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1976). Contra, LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 26:566
TRUTH IN LENDING
rebate provision covering prepayments," but did not have an
applicable rebate provision in the event of acceleration as
Johnson did by virtue of the state statute. Thus, unearned fi-
nance charges could be retained by the creditor. The acceleration
provision which appeared in the note" was not included in the
disclosure statement, however, and consequently the debtor
claimed that the creditor had violated section 226.8(b)(4) of the
Regulation by this omission.
The court in Martin parted company with Johnson in rejecting
the Board's characterization of acceleration as a prepayment.'
The court took the view that "[in the installment credit con-
text, prepayment and acceleration appear to be conceptually an-
tithetical."" In recognizing this distinction, the court grasped a
concept that has evaded other courts, that is, the buyer prepays
while the creditor accelerates. The terms are by no means synony-
mous. It was a recognition of this fundamental difference that
compelled the court to conclude with confidence that the credi-
tor's failure to disclose an acceleration clause and its rebate policy
of retaining unearned finance charges did not violate the Act or
the Regulation.
It must be observed that in section 226.8(b)(4), the words
"default, delinquency or similar" qualify the term "charges."
Therefore, the kind of charge contemplated by the Regulation is
one that is akin to a default or delinquency charge and the latter
type has been regarded consistently as an additional monetary
obligation associated with a late payment. This interpretation is
in keeping with traditional statutory construction. 7 Considera-
43. 539 F.2d at 522, nn.4-5.
44. Id. at 522.
45. Id. at 529. The court declined to accept the Board's staff opinion by stating: "With
deference, we find its one-sentence conclusion that an acceleration of payments is essen-
tially a prepayment of the contract obligation to be an analytical construction of regula-
tory intent which has not been expressed in language that 'all who run may read.'"
46. Id. This language emphasized the voluntary nature of prepayment in this context.
Whatever payment occurs after acceleration is usually involuntary.
47. There are several aids to statutory construction. The meaning of certain words may
be gleaned from their association with other words in the statute. Accordingly, when it is
associated with "default" and "delinquency," its meaning becomes rather clear. C. SANDS,
2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §47.16 (4th ed. 1973). Furthermore, in the
absence of contrary legislative intent, words with established meanings in the consumer
and commercial credit context are presumed to have those meanings in a statute covering
the credit industry. See id. at §47.31.
19771
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tion of the term "charges" in isolation would not accord due
deference to the requirement of a similarity between the charge
accruing from acceleration and that accruing from a default or
delinquency. In pursuing this requirement, the Martin court not
only put things in proper perspective, but it also declined to
incorporate a disclosure requirement for acceleration within the
general purposes of the Act. This approach placed the burden on
the Board, for the Board could require the disclosure of an accel-
eration provision as clearly as it mandated the disclosure of the
consequences of prepayment.
After Martin any conclusion that unearned finance charges re-
tained by the creditor upon acceleration would make the acceler-
ation a charge was laid to rest in McDaniel v. Fulton National
Bank of Altanta. 11 In McDaniel the Fifth Circuit held on the basis
of Martin that acceleration was not a charge. In its decision, the
court emphasized that Martin's characterization of acceleration
did not depend on the creditor's rebate policy on unearned fi-
nance charges. 9 This was an appropriate response to the debtor's
contention that Martin stood only for the proposition that accel-
eration of principal and earned finance charges was not a charge.
In dismissing that contention, the McDaniel court correctly re-
jected the narrower holding of Johnson which had supported dis-
closure of acceleration as a charge only when the creditor claimed
unearned finance charges.
It is submitted, therefore, that McDaniel properly character-
ized the Martin decision and that the Fifth Circuit took the cor-
rect stand in holding that the disclosure of acceleration is not
required either under the Act or the Regulation. Finally, it must
be noted that this exclusion of acceleration from the disclosure
requirements is not contingent upon a consideration whether the
48. 543 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1976). This case was consolidated on appeal with two other
cases from the federal district court in the Northern District of Georgia. Barrett v. Vernie
Jones Ford, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Ga. 1975), and Barksdale v. Peoples Fin. Corp.,
393 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1975). The basic question was "whether the Act as imple-
mented by Regulation Z requires a creditor to disclose as a default charge the fact that
the loan agreement gives him the contract right to accelerate and demand payment of the
entire indebtedness, including unearned finance charges, when state law provides only
that usurious unearned finance charges may not be exacted in a state court proceeding to
collect the accelerated indebtedness." 543 F.2d at 569.
49. Id. at 570.
[Vol. 26:566
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creditor stands to benefit from earned or unearned finance
charges. The fact is that acceleration does not come within the
definition of "similar charges." 50
SECURITY INTEREST AND AFTER-AcQUIRED PROPERTY CLAUSE
Certain specific disclosures are required in closed-end credit
transactions.5' Among them are the description or identification
of the type of security interest held by the creditor and a clear
50. A collateral problem arising in the cases is whether a creditor is required to disclose
a finance charge which may be in excess of that permitted by state law. In Barrett v.
Vernie Jones Ford, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Ga. 1975), the district court construed
the contract as calling for the payment of usurious interest and suggested that this legal
impropriety did not detract from the requirement of full disclosure by the creditor. Id. at
911. The debtor's default gave the creditor the right to accelerate all unpaid installments
and such installments would have included precomputed interest. The creditor's invoca-
tion of this remedy would have led to his benefiting from unearned finance charges. If
those finance charges collected by the creditor were in excess of those permitted by law,
that should have no effect on the final determination of whether their disclosure should
be required in the first place. This logically leads to the broader question whether the
information to be disclosed under Regulation Z should be controlled by the remedies per-
mitted under state law. In this connection, it must be recalled that neither the Act nor
the Regulation was intended to control charges for consumer credit. 12 C.F.R. §226.1(a)(2)
(1976). Therefore, it is entirely possible for a creditor to run afoul of the state's usury laws
while complying with the requirements of Regulation Z. Whether that is a desirable
prospect or not is subject to debate. One of the relevant considerations is that the con-
sumer should be able to compare the various credit terms available from different lenders
so as to make meaningful choices in his use of credit. If a creditor extends credit at an
illegal rate of interest, a disclosure of that rate probably puts the consumer in a better
position to compare the exorbitant rate of interest with the rate charged by other creditors
in the market place. He then may be able to make a more meaningful choice and to that
extent the disclosure of the illegal rate inures indirectly to his benefit. This is not to
suggest that a lender should be absolved from liability for usury on this ground. However,
a requirement of disclosure under Regulation Z ought not be affected by the illegality of
the charge except to the extent that it may affect the consumer's meaningful choice of
credit terms. 395 F. Supp. at 912. The court in Barrett said that a 50% per annum interest
rate would not be a Truth-in-Lending violation as long as it was clearly disclosed by the
Act. Id. A creditor's claim to unearned finance charges, illegal as it may be, should not
affect the creditor's duty to disclose those charges. A contrary interpretation might be
regarded as creating an alliance between the requirement of disclosure and the legality of
the charges disclosed. Id. Regulation Z expressly disavows its intention to control charges
imposed on the debtor. See 12 C.F.R. §226.1(a)(2) (1976). It is primarily a disclosure
statute and, as such, its provisions ought not to be interpreted as imposing a requirement
of disclosure contingent upon the legality of the provisions disclosed.
51. Closed-end transactions are characterized by "a total fixed amount to be repaid in
installments. This amount is usually determinable in advance and consists of principal
(the cash price) and a finance charge." SPEIDEL, SUMMERS & WHImT, COMMERCIAL AND
CONSUMER LAw, pt. 2, ch. 15, §2, at 433 (2d ed. 1974).
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identification of the property to which that security interest re-
lates. In addition, if the creditor wishes to subject after-acquired
property to the security interest, that fact must be set forth
clearly. 5 Section 9-204(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code pro-
vides that no security interest can attach under an after-acquired
property clause to consumer goods other than accessions unless
the debtor acquires the goods within ten days after the creditor
gives value.53 Thus, the creditor's security interest has very lim-
ited application to consumer goods acquired after the original
credit has been extended. Occasionally, though, the creditor will
use a general statement in his credit documents subjecting the
debtor's after-acquired property to the security interest without
stipulating the ten-day limitation set out in section 9-204(2) of
the Code. The question arises, therefore, whether the creditor's
failure to include this ten-day limitation within the security in-
terest provision violates section 226.6(c) of Regulation Z because
of its misleading nature or whether it violates section 226.8(b)(5)
for failure to describe adequately the security interest.
One of the first cases to deal with the issue, Kenney v. Lan-
dis Financial Group, Inc. ,"' held that the creditor's failure to in-
clude the ten-day limitation in its security interest provision vio-
lated section 226.6(c) of Regulation Z because it was calculated
to mislead or confuse the customer. The court did not regard it
as a violation of section 226.8(b) (5). However, in Johnson v. Asso-
ciates Finance, Inc.," the court found a similar omission to be a
violation of both sections 226.6(c) and 226.8(b)(5).5 6
52. 12 C.F.R. §226.8(b)(5) (1976).
53. See note 9 supra.
54. 349 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Iowa 1972).
55. 369 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. I1. 1974).
56. 12 C.F.R. §226.6(c) (1976) provides in part as follows:
(c) Additional information. At the creditor's option, additional information or
explanations may be supplied with any disclosure required by this part, but
none shall be stated, utilized, or placed so as to mislead or confuse the customer,
or contradict, obscure, or detract attention from the information required by
this point to be disclosed.
12 C.F.R. §226.8(b)(5) (1976) provides in part as follows:
If after-acquired property will be subject to the security interest, or if other
or future indebtedness is or may be secured by any such property, this fact shall
be clearly set forth in conjunction with the description or identification of the
type of security interest held, retained or acquired.
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The Federal Reserve Board has issued an opinion on the re-
quirements affecting disclosure of the after-acquired property
clause. Initially it stated that the creditor should not disclose a
security interest in after-acquired property beyond that permit-
ted by state law.57 However, that opinion was later qualified to
the extent that the Board deemed it permissible for the creditor
merely to state the fact that after-acquired property was subject
to the security interest and that there was no obligation for him
to go further to define the limitations imposed by state law. 8 In
fact, a close examination of section 226.8(b)(5) reveals that it
calls only for a disclosure of the fact that after-acquired property
is subject to the security interest.5 Thus, a fair reading of the
statute is in accord with the Board's later opinion.1°
In Sneed v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Hawaii, 410 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Hawaii 1976) the
creditor found himself facing allegations similar to those made in Kenney and Johnson.
The creditor argued that his overstatement of the scope of his security interest should be
excused because it made his credit terms seem less attractive to the debtor. Id. at 1142.
He also sought to bring himself within coverage of section 226.6(h) of the Regulation which
forgives an overstatement of the finance charge if it is not intended to circumvent or evade
the disclosure requirements. 12 C.F.R. §226.6(h) (1976). The court felt that the statute
should be strictly construed and, therefore, section 226.6(h) should be limited to the cases
dealing specifically with the finance charge or percentage rate. Furthermore, even if the
section did apply in this case, the burden of proof would be on the creditor to show that
his overstatement of the security interest was not based on circumvention of the disclosure
requirements. 410 F. Supp. at 1142.
See also FED. RES. BD. INTERPRETATION, 12 C.F.R. §226.601 (1976) in which the Board
states that section 226.6(h) is intended for an accidental overstatement of the annual
percentage rate. Thus, even if section 226.6(h) could be interpreted as applying to a case
like Sneed, it would not help the defendant because there was nothing accidental about
the overstatement of the security interest. The courts have taken a strict line in dealing
with situations where creditors have sought to avoid liability for disclosure errors. Forgive-
ness for the most part has been restricted to clerical errors. See, e.g., Turner v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 537 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1976); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York
Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
57. FED. RES. BD. STAFF OPINION LErrrT No. 829, August 22, 1974, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) §31, 151.
58. FED. RES. BD. STAFF OPINION LErra No. 983, December 30, 1975, 5 CONS. CRED.
GUIDE (CCH) §31, 323.
59. "If after-acquired property will be subject to the security interest . this fact
shall be clearly set forth . . . ." 12 C.F.R. §226.8(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
60. In Willis v. Town Fin. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ga. 1976), the court declined
to accept the recommendation of a special master that the Regulation did not require the
creditor to disclose the ten-day limitation with respect to after-acquired consumer goods.
The creditor in Willis had relied on a Board "Staff Opinion Letter" dated January 5, 1975
which had clarified the previous Staff Letter No. 829 dated August 22, 1974, 5 CONS. CRED.
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However, in Tinsman v. Moline Beneficial Finance Co.," the
disclosure statement referred to a security interest covering all
consumer goods owned or thereafter acquired by the debtor. 2 The
court found a violation of the Regulation because the creditor did
not mention the ten-day limitation applicable to after-acquired
consumer goods. But again the security interest disclosure went
far beyond that required by section 226.8(b)(5). The language
purported to cover all after-acquired consumer goods. There is a
difference between that kind of statement and one that simply
states the fact that after-acquired property will be covered by the
security interest." Those cases that have dealt with the problem
have been concerned with statements which not only went be-
yond legal possibilities, but also misled the consumer into think-
ing that all his future consumer acquisitions would be subject to
the security interest. Furthermore, the clause in Tinsman not
only ignored the ten-day limitation, but it purported to cover all
consumer goods located on the debtor's property. Such breadth
of coverage could not be tolerated when the clause might be inter-
preted as applying to consumer goods in the debtor's possession
but belonging to someone else. The result in this case is not incon-
GUIDE (CCH) §31,151, and supported the approach that the creditor should state only the
fact that after-acquired property would be subject to the security interest. The court was
confronted with the view of the Fifth Circuit in Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet Co., 499
F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1974), which held that the Board's opinions were entitled to some
deference in interpreting the Regulation. Despite the admonition of the Philbeck court,
the Willis court chose to emphasize the recent view of the Second Circuit in Ives v. W. T.
Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975), in which it was stated that the good faith defense
could not be predicated on Board letters and pamphlets because they were not part of the
Regulation. This was, indeed, a respectable escape for the Willis court for it seemed less
interested in reaching a basic discussion of the issues than in ensuring that the Board's
view did not prevail. However, the court was eager to commend the special master for his
well-reasoned opinion and in furtherance of that commendation was willing to certify this
question of disclosure to the Court of Appeals. 416 F. Supp. at 13.
61. 531 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1976).
62. Id. at 818. The controversial language was as follows:
All of the consumer goods of every kind now owned or hereafter acquired by
Debtors in replacement of said consumer goods and now owned or hereafter
located in or about the place of residence of the Debtors' at the address shown
above . ...
63. A disclosure that the security interest affects all after-acquired property certainly
is different from a simple statement of the fact that after-acquired property may be
subject to the security interest.
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sistent therefore with the position advocated by the Board. 4
Section 226.8(b)(5) calls for a clear statement of the fact that
after-acquired property will be subject to the security interest.
That requirement does not seem to include a discourse on the
various terms and conditions imposed by state law on such after-
acquired property interest. As recently as May 28, 1976, the
Board restated its position that a simple disclosure of the fact
that after-acquired property was subject to security interest
would be sufficient to comply with section 226.8(b)(5).5 However,
the Board was careful to point out the distinction between such
a simple disclosure and a disclosure which purported to subject
all after-acquired property to the security interest.
It is submitted, therefore, that the difficulties experienced by
creditors in the cited cases were a product of their own linguistic
variations which went beyond the simple requirements of the
statute. The alleged submission of all consumer goods subse-
quently acquired by the debtor to the creditor's security interest,
is clearly a misstatement of law and indeed perplexing to the
debtor. Furthermore, such incorrect information cannot be toler-
ated for it constitutes a violation of section 226.8(b)(5). As long
as the creditor fulfills the requirements of describing or identify-
ing the type of security interest held or retained in connection
with the transaction, the only other requirement with respect to
after-acquired property is a clear statement that such property
will be subject to the security interest of the creditor. There
should be no need to elaborate on the various limitatons of the
particular state statute. Such an exercise simply might result in
a failure to live up to the statutory mandates of section
226.8(b) (5).
BONA FIDE ERROR DEFENSE
The technical aspects of the Act and the Regulation have
caused even the most cautious creditors to make errors in their
disclosure statements. This possibility was contemplated during
64. See Sneed v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Hawaii, 410 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Hawaii 1976).




hearings on the original Senate bill." As a result, an exemption
was written into the Act excusing violations when the creditor
could show that they were not intentional and that they resulted
from bona fide errors in spite of the maintenance of procedures
calculated to avoid such errors." This exemption became known
as the "good faith defense."
Under the Act the good faith defense is available only if the
error occurred in spite of procedures maintained to avoid it. The
statutory reference to the maintenance of procedures is directed
towards mathematical or clerical errors. This conclusion is con-
firmed by the legislative history which shows that the exemption
was inserted to accommodate the concerns of creditors that the
complexity of the statute would produce such clerical errors." A
different approach would place a frustrating burden on debtors
seeking a civil remedy under the Act"9 since such debtors would
have great difficulty in overcoming the creditors' good faith de-
fense.
This statutory exemption does not apply to mistakes of law. 0
A mistake of law caused by reliance on counsel's advice in making
the appropriate disclosures does not detract from the deliberate-
ness of the disclosure omissions and would not exempt the credi-
tor from civil liability under the statute.7' In fact, not even reli-
66. Hearings on S. 5 Before Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Sen. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
67. 15 U.S.C.A. §1640(c) (Supp. 1976).
68. See note 66 supra.
69. 15 U.S.C.A. §1640(a) (Supp. 1976).
70. The first test came in Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp.
270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), in which the creditor neglected to disclose a nominal annual percen-
tage rate in a billing statement mailed to a debtor under an open-end credit plan. The
creditor's claim to exemption from liability was predicated basically on a genuine mistake
of law. The court's view was that the statutory exemption did not apply to such mistakes.
It was felt that the bank intended to omit the disclosure even though that intent was
formulated on the basis of a misconstruction of the disclosure requirements. Accord,
Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 537 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1976); Mirabal v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1976); Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d
749 (2d Cir. 1975); Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974).
71. This was confirmed in Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161 (7th
Cir. 1974), in which the creditor sought comfort from the fact that its disclosure violations
were unintentional. In spite of the creditor's assertions, the court concluded that the
statutory requirement of intent concerned the acts performed rather than a knowing and
willful violation of the law itself. Id. at 1166. By avoiding the "knowing and willful"
connotation, the court in effect distinguished the civil liability and the criminal liability
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ance on the Board's advice and publications relieves creditors
from liability."
A deviation from this rule was enunciated in Wellmaker v.
W. T. Grant Co.73 In Welimaker, the court found that the creditor
had acted in good faith when it relied on Board publications in
making its disclosures and that the violation was not intentional
but resulted from a bona fide error despite the maintenance of
procedures adopted to avoid such error. The court thus suggested
that the intent required by the statute was the intent to commit
the violation rather than the intent to commit the act or omis-
sions. The court did not see how the creditor in this case could
have gone to any further lengths to comply with the statutory
disclosures since some of its forms had received prior approval
from the Federal Trade Commission.74 However, the creditor's
responsibility, is one of continuing vigilance. Therefore, a credi-
tor must maintain procedures to keep himself informed of deci-
sions on disclosure requirements in order to avoid violations.75
The Board recognized the difficulty caused when a creditor
faithfully relies on a section of the Regulation only to have a court
subsequently invalidate it. As a result, the Board suggested an
additional type of good faith defense under which the creditor's
compliance with the Regulation would not place him in legal
difficulty if the Regulation subsequently was invalidated by a
court decision.7" Section 1640 thus was amended to provide free-
dom from liability for any good faith act or omission resulting
from reliance on any rule, regulation, or interpretation by the
Board even if such rule, regulation, or interpretation thereafter
standards. Compare, 15 U.S.C.A. §1611 (1974) (willful and knowing standard), with 15
U.S.C. §1640 (1974 & Supp. 1976) (standard of failure to comply).
72. See, e.g., Scott v. Liberty Fin. Co., 380 F. Supp. 475 (D. Nev. 1974); Johnson v.
Assoc. Fin., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. Ill. 1974).
73. 365 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
74. The Federal Trade Commission is charged with overall enforcement of the Act,
except to the extent that some other agency is specifically assigned that task with respect
to banks and certain other specialized insitutions. 15 U.S.C.A. §1607 (1974 & Supp. 1976).
75. See Rolader v. Georgia Power Co., 5 CoNs. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98684 (N.D. Ga.
1974) (when the creditor had failed to include the term "unpaid balance" in a credit
sometime after other court decisions in the district had been rendered requiring that
disclosure).
76. [1972] FED. REs. BD. TRuTH-IN-LENDING ANN. REP. 14-15.
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was rendered invalid for any reason.7 7 However, when the drafters
considered that amendment, they apparently intended that reli-
ance on Board staff letters or pamphlets would not suffice.78 Civil
liability could be avoided only if a creditor relied on a formal
rule, regulation, or interpretation of the Board itself, as opposed
to merely an opinion from an employee of the Board. Thus, when
the creditor's reliance was based on staff letters and staff pam-
phlets, the Second Circuit held that he could not depend on sec-
tion 1640(f) to avoid civil liability for failure to use the term
"unpaid balance."79
Recently, the court in St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii,s0 ac-
corded a degree of deference to staff opinion letters even though
section 1640(f) did not mention them as a basis for the good faith
defense. The court in St. Germain said that it could not agree
with the position that reliance on staff letters and pamphlets was
legally insufficient under section 1640(f). Its view ultimately was
sustained by a recent amendment to the Act which extended the
section 1640(f) protection to any act done or omitted in reliance
on any interpretation or approval by a duly authorized Federal
Reserve official or employee.8 ' Such an amendment was reasona-
ble in view of the tendency of creditors to regard such staff opin-
ions with respect. After all, creditors could not be expected to
consult any higher authority in their attempts to disseminate
truth in lending. Creditors now will be able to plan their disclo-
sures with the assurance that their reliance on Board staff opin-
ions will not be misplaced. Hopefully, this will promote a better
understanding of the technicalities of the Act and the Regulation.
RESCISSION AND DAMAGES
Except for certain limited exceptions, a customer has the right
to rescind a credit transaction within three days if a security
interest is taken in his principal residence. 2 The customer also is
77. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, §406, 88 Stat. 1518 (1974).
78. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT
AMENDMENTS, S. REP. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973).
79. Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975).
80. 413 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii 1976).
81. Act of Feb. 27, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, §3(b), 90 Stat. 197 (1976).
82. 12 C.F.R. §226.9(a) (1976). 12 C.F.R. §226.9(g) provides that the right of rescission
does not apply to:
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exempt from liability for any finance or other charge and the
security interest in any of his property becomes void upon such
rescission. 3 In addition, the creditor is required to return any
property belonging to the customer within ten days and to initiate
action necessary to terminate the security interest. A literal inter-
pretation of the statute suggests that the customer is obligated
to return any property belonging to the creditor only if the credi-
tor has completed those steps. Thus, the creditor's performance
under the rescission section seems to be a condition precedent to
the performance of the customer's obligation to return the credi-
tor's property.
Nevertheless, some courts have conditioned the exercise of the
rescission right on the customer's return of loan funds.84 It is
arguable that imposition of such a requirement of tender on the
debtor before the security interest can be removed destroys the
effect of the statute because the security interest will in fact be
(1) The creation, retention, or assumption of a first lien or equivalent security
interest to finance the acquisition of a dwelling in which the customer resides
or expects to reside.
(2) A security interest which is a first lien retained or acquired by a creditor
in connection with the financing of the initial construction of the residence of
the customer, or in connection with a loan committed prior to completion of the
construction of that residence to satisfy that construction loan and provide
permanent financing of that residence, whether or not the customer previously
owned the land on which that residence is to be constructed.
(3) Any lien by reason of its subordination at any time subsequent to its
creation, if that lien was exempt from the provisions of this section when it was
originally created.
(4) Any advance for agricultural purposes made pursuant to either:
(i) Paragraph (j) of §226.8 under an open-end real estate mortgage
or similar lien, provided the disclosure required under paragraph (b)
of this section was made at the time the security interest was acquired
by the creditor or at any time prior to the first advance made on or
following the effective date of this part, or (ii) Paragraph (p) of
§226.8 under a written agreement, provided the disclosure required
under paragraph (b) of this section was made at the time the written
agreement was executed by the customer.
(5) Any transaction in which an agency of a State is the creditor.
83. 12 C.F.R. §226.9(d) (1976).
84. For example, the court in Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1974), held that
in any case in which an obligor sought to rescind the transaction and also to recover
statutory penalties, the court could condition the rescission right on the debtor's tender
of funds advanced by the creditor.
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ineffectual once tender has been made."5 If the right of rescission
was granted to allow the consumer to release himself from an ill-
conceived transaction, then the procedural steps outlined in the
Regulation must have been intended to assure him of the credi-
tor's cooperation in achieving the status quo ante."6 The argument
that the creditor would lose the security of his lien on the cus-
tomer's rescission obviously was anticipated because the lan-
guage of the statute provides that "any security interest becomes
void upon statutory rescission.""7
The procedural problems of rescission were revealed in the re-
cent case of Powers v. Sims.8 1 In that case, the creditor made a
loan to the borrowers to pay for certain home improvements and
to pay off an outstanding mortgage and property taxes. Some
weeks later the borrowers attempted to rescind the transaction on
the grounds that they had not received any of the disclosures
required by the Truth-in-Lending Act. Consequently, on October
1, 1974, they offered to return the reasonable value of the home
improvements. The creditor did not regard this gesture as suffi-
cient because the borrowers had made no mention of the other
funds advanced by the creditor to pay off their earlier indebted-
ness. Though the creditor was convinced that it had provided the
necessary disclosures, it was willing to release the mortgage secur-
ing its loan if the borrowers were willing to make restitution.
The court read the October 1st letter as impliedly expressing
the borrower's intent not to reimburse the creditor for funds used
in discharging the prior obligations.8 9 The court, therefore,
85. Id. at 863. (Wright, J., dissenting). See also Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 411 F.
Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1975).
86. 502 F.2d at 863 (Wright, J., dissenting). See also Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114 (5th
Cir. 1974).
87. 15 U.S.C. §1635(b) (1970) provides in part as follows:
When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a) of this
section, he is not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest
given by the obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of law,
becomes void upon such a rescission ....
88. 542 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1976).
89. Plaintiffs' letter of October 1, 1974, reads as follows:
Dear Sirs:
I have received your letter dated September 25, 1974, denying my right to
cancel and rescind the transaction we entered into on or about July 22, 1974. In
my letter of September 20, 1974, notifying you of my decision to cancel the
transaction, I neglected to offer to return to you the property constituting the
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treated the debtors' letter as an anticipatory breach of contract
stating that the creditor was entitled to retain both the initial
payment of $50 and a security interest in debtors' property. 0
The court reasoned that the creditor had ten days to act under
the statute but that his obligation to act was discharged by the
borrowers' refusal to return the payments made by the creditor
to the previous mortgagees. Thus, the court held that it would
condition rescission on the debtors' reimbursement to the creditor
of the funds advanced under the transaction.
As noted previously, the debtors' reason for rescinding the
transaction was based on their claim that they had not received
any of the disclosures required by the Truth-in-Lending Act. Al-
though the creditor disputed that contention, that issue was not
critical because the court found a violation different from the one
raised by the debtors. The violation discovered by the court was
that the disclosure of the notice of rescission right gave the debt-
ors only two days to rescind instead of the statutory three-day
period." In such a case, the right to rescind continues until three
days after the creditor has fulfilled the disclosure requirements.
The creditor's misstatement of this material disclosure thus ex-
tended the debtors' right of rescission.2 Therefore, when the debt-
ors sent their rescission notice to the creditor, they were clearly
home improvements made or if this is not possible the reasonable value of the
property. This letter is intended to inform you that I am willing to return to you
the property constituting the home improvements or if this is not possible, the
reasonable value of the property.
Please let me know whether this offer changes your previous position regard-
ing recission [sic].
/s/Eugene R. Powers
Id. at 1224 n.3.
90. Id. at 1221.
91. The customer has until midnight of the third business day following the date of
consummation or the date of delivery of all required disclosures, whichever is later. 15
U.S.C. §1635(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). A business day is any calendar day except
Sunday, New Year's Day, Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day,
Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day. 12
C.F.R. §226.9(a) & n.14 (1976). The rescission right expires three years after consumma-
tion of the transaction or on the date that the customer transfers his interest in the
property, whichever is earlier. 15 U.S.C. §1635(f) (1974); 12 C.F.R. §226.9(h) (1976).
92. The right to rescind continues for three days following the date of consummation
of the transaction or the date of all material disclosures, whichever is later. 15 U.S.C.
§1635(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974); 12 C.F.R. §226.9(a) (1976).
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within their prerogative to withdraw from the transaction al-
though they were rescinding on a ground different from the one
ultimately dealt with by the court.
When it is recalled that the Regulation does not require the
statement of a reason for rescission,93 the debtors' letter of Octo-
ber 1st can be regarded as a gratuitous gesture to the extent that
it discussed the reasons for the debtors' rescission. Moreover, had
the letter been silent on the probable return of the home improve-
ments, there could have been no inference that the debtors in-
tended to withhold the loan refund. However, the debtors sought
an equitable remedy, and they should have been prepared to do
equity by not seeking unjust enrichment through rescission. Ac-
cordingly, it is suggested that if a debtor is unwilling or unable
to make restitution in a case like Powers, the court should exer-
cise its discretion to condition rescission on the debtor's return of
the loan proceeds.
There should be no problem when the debtor rescinds within
three days after the consummation of the transaction because the
creditor is not expected to advance any funds until that three-day
period has expired. Thus, the procedural problems involved in
deciding whether the debtor's return of funds should precede
removal of the mortgage lien should not exist in that situation.
The difficulty arises in the case, such as Powers, in which the
borrower has a right to rescind after the three-day period and the
creditor has already disbursed the loan. This right may exist
because the debtor did not make all the required disclosures or
may have misstated the length of the period for rescinding. If it
is shown that the creditor has not complied with the Regulation,
the debtor obviously should be permitted to rescind but that right
should not grant the debtor the unfettered discretion to withhold
the proceeds of the transaction.
While it is true that the debtor is not required to state his
reason for rescinding the transaction, it is submitted that the lack
of this requirement creates some problems when the right to res-
cind is exercised more than three days after the transaction is
consummated. If the creditor believes that he has complied with
93. 12 C.F.R. §226.9(a) (1976). "[T]he customer shall have the right to rescind . . .
by notifying the creditor by mail, telegram, or other writing of his intention to do so."
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all requirements, he probably will not be eager to respond to the
debtor's claim to rescission. Therefore, the creditor's willingness
to contest the debtor's rescission in these circumstances should
not deprive him of restitution. If a violation is found, the proper
judicial approach should be to grant the creditor a ten-day period
to return all charges to the debtor and remove the lien from the
debtor's property. The debtor then should return all proceeds
advanced by the creditor. The same approach should be taken
when the debtor erroneously bases his rescission on a non-existent
violation although another violation, which has escaped the no-
tice of both the creditor and the debtor, does exist. Obviously, in
that case the creditor will be firm in his contention that the
debtor's basis for rescinding should not be sustained. This would
be a legitimate position until a court reveals the real violation. It
then would be appropriate to regard the debtor's rescission as
timely and to preserve the creditor's right to restitution.
A collateral problem raised by Powers was whether the joint
obligors, husband and wife in this case, were each entitled to the
statutory penalty of $1,000.11 The Fourth Circuit disagreed with
the district court's position on this question and held that there
could only be a single recovery of $1,000. The court based its
opinion on the fact that there was one credit transaction and
referred to some legislative history indicating that Congress in-
tended to impose a civil penalty of a minimum of $100 and a
maximum of $1,000 on any "individual credit transaction. '" '5
However, it should be noted that a creditor is obligated to make
a clear and conspicuous disclosure to each person to whom credit
is extended." The same provision facilitates disclosure to some
extent by providing that a creditor need furnish a statement of
94. 15 U.S.C.A. §1640(a) (Supp. 1H 1976) states in part:
(a) [AJny creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under
this part or part D of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such
person in the amount equal to the sum of
(1) Any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the failure;
(2) (A) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance
charge in connection with the transaction, except that the liability under this
subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000.
95. H.R. RP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1976.
96. 15 U.S.C. §1631(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1976); 12 C.F.R. §226.6(a) (1976).
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information to one obligor only when there is more than one in-
volved in the particular transaction." Some courts have argued
that this accommodation does not in any way detract from a
creditor's obligation to disclose the appropriate information to all
obligors and that the requirement of a single statement is simply
a way of avoiding enormous paperwork for creditors. Thus,
under this view an incorrect disclosure to one obligor may create
civil liability towards several obligors in the transaction.99
If the creditor does not comply with the disclosure require-
ments with respect to any person, he is liable to that person not
only for actual damage sustained, but also for a penalty between
$100 and $1,000. If a creditor has made inaccurate disclosures to
joint obligors, he has failed to live up to his obligations with
respect to such persons and the statute should be interpreted as
imposing liability on all obligors in such a case. Even if it is
argued that the requirement of a single disclosure statement is
generally applicable to joint obligors and therefore there should
be a single recovery in the event of a violation, that argument
does not withstand scrutiny in the case of a rescindable transac-
tion. Section 226.6(e) of the Regulation provides for a single dis-
closure statement only in the case of transactions which are not
subject to rescission under section 226.9. But in transactions
which are subject to rescission, the creditor must make full disclo-
sures to all obligors, including the notice of the right to rescind. 00
The creditor's default with respect to any person should subject
him to liability to such person to the extent of the penalty set out
in the Act.'0'
At least in rescindable transactions, the creditor has a duty to
make the necessary disclosures to each obligor whose property is
being subjected to the security interest and, therefore, liability
97. 15 U.S.C. §1631(b) (1970 & Supp. IV 1976); 12 C.F.R. §226.6(a) (1976).
98. See, e.g., Mirabel v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
1976); Simmons v. American Budget Plan, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. La. 1974).
99. 531 F.2d at 806.
100. 15 U.S.C. §1635(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974); 12 C.F.R. §§226.6(e), 226.9(b), 226.9(j)
(1976).
101. See Simmons v. American Budget Plan, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. La. 1974),
in which the court distinguishes St. Marie v. Southland Mobil Homes, 376 F. Supp. 996
(E.D. La. 1974) on the ground that the creditor in the latter case was obligated to furnish
only one disclosure because the transactions were not subject to rescission.
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ought to extend from the creditor to all such parties in accordance
with the language of the civil liability section. The court in
Powers said that it was "not to be lightly supposed that that
statutory maximum [was] to be doubled, trebled, or quadru-
pled, depending upon the number of the joint obligors in a single
consumer credit transaction."'' ° Whether that language was to be
taken as an expression of the harshness of the contemplated pen-
alty is unclear. From time to time creditors have felt the full
impact of the civil liability statute. For example, the class action
section allows the court to impose liability to the extent of a total
amount of the lesser of $100,000 or 1% of the net worth of the
creditor. 03 Therefore, the penalty for violations may be harsh
indeed in appropriate circumstances. Furthermore, the legisla-
tive history relied upon by the court does not necessarily support
the conclusion that there could only be one recovery.0 4 An exami-
nation of the same legislative history indicates the following lan-
guage concerning civil penalties:
While primary enforcement of the Bill would be accomplished
under the administrative enforcement section discussed above,
further provision is made for the institution of civil action by an
aggrieved debtor."'
The question, then, is whether joint obligors can be aggrieved
debtors within the meaning of the civil liability section. If a joint
102. 542 F.2d at 1219.
103. 15 U.S.C.A. §1640(a) 2(B) (Supp. II 1976). A recent amendment, effective March
13, 1977, has increased the maximum class action recovery to $500,000. Act of March 23,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, §4, 90 Stat. 260.
104. The court relied on the following language in H.R. REP. No. 1040; 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 19, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1976:
Any creditor failing to disclose required information would be subject to a civil
suit with a penalty equal to twice the amount of the finance charge, with a
minimum penalty of $100 and a maximum penalty not to exceed $1,000 on any
individual credit transaction.
542 F.2d at 1219. If this language is to be interpreted as preventing recovery by other
aggrieved debtors, the problem arises of dividing the spoils if the first plaintiff does recover
the maximum $1,000. Can the passive joint obligor recoup later from the successful
plaintiff? The cited passage is merely a description of the penalty provisions appearing
in the legislative history and should not be used to displace the liability imposed on the
creditor with respect to any person not receiving the appropriate disclosures.
105. H.R. REp. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1976 (emphasis added).
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obligor can be misled by faulty disclosures and if the creditor has
an obligation under the statute not to mislead such an obligor,
then it may be said that he is in fact an aggrieved debtor to the
extent that the creditor has not fulfilled his statutory obligations.
This position is even stronger when rescindable transactions are
involved because it is clear in such cases that the disclosures,
including the notice of the right to rescind, must be provided to
all joint obligors. But even if the transaction is not rescindable,
the duty to disclose to all obligors is not lessened, even if a disclo-
sure statement need only be given to one of them. 06
CONCLUSION
While there has been considerable progress in reaching the ulti-
mate goal of truth in lending, there are still some difficulties in
the process. Some of them are the natural product of a technical
statute. Others are the result of judicial differences which arise
from variable readings of legislative history. It is perhaps unfor-
tunate that occasionally some courts have read more into the
statute than a fair reading would suggest, thus contributing to
confusion in the market place. 17 Thus, some courts have regarded
acceleration as a material ingredient of any disclosure state-
ment. 0 8 This argument is made on the general principal that the
purpose of the Act is to reveal to the debtor all the basic terms of
the loan. If acceleration is regarded as a necessary disclosure
item, then it is submitted that an amendment to the Act and the
Regulation is required. There is little basis for construing acceler-
ation as a charge within the current provisions.
A similar comment may be made about other disclosure re-
quirements discussed. The fact that after-acquired property will
be subject to the creditor's security interest must be revealed in
the disclosure statement.'"0 The state law limitations are not dis-
106. Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 882 (7th Cir. 1976).
107. See, e.g., Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9, 16 (D. Ore. 1975) (the court
readily conceded that the creditor was not required to disclose the right of acceleration as
an additional charge, but since it was an obvious concern to the borrower, the creditor
was obligated to disclose it to comply with the "meaningful disclosure" provisions of the
Act).
108. See Pollock v. Avco Fin. Serv., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98766 (N.D. Ga.
1974). But see St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 413 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii 1976).
109. See notes 76 & 87 supra.
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closures required by federal statute although it is certainly desira-
ble to have an additional statement concerning the extent to
which such after-acquired property may be affected by such secu-
rity interest."0 The effect of the decisions on this point has been
to indicate the need for an amendment which would require the
disclosure of such restrictions as the ten-day limitation in the
Code. Such a revision in the current statutory language would
curtail the linguistic variations which creditors have used in order
to harness their security. Disclosing too much can sometimes be
as harmful as disclosing too little.
Concerning damages, it would seem that each aggrieved debtor
should be entitled to recover the statutory penalty."' The control-
ling language appears to be the creditor's failure to comply with
the disclosure requirements with respect to any person."2 The
creditor's avoidance of liability to more than one obligor in a
transaction must be predicated on the theory that the duty of
disclosure is not owed to more than one person in each transac-
tion. If that is so, the creditor still must face the peculiarities of
a rescindable transaction in which he must supply all parties to
the transaction with the required disclosure statement."3 It is
incongruous to suggest that such a duty exists but that a violation
will result in liability for a penalty to only one of the parties.", If
the legislative intent is to restrict the creditor's liability, then
clarification is needed to limit that liability and to avoid the
conflict between the courts."' Congress did resolve through an
110. However, such additional information must be given in such a way as not to be
misleading and confusing. 12 C.F.R. §226.6(c) (1976).
111. 537 F.2d 871. This ability to recover must be predicated on the conclusion that the
creditor's option to provide a single statement of information in the case of multiple
obligors does not absolve him of the responsibility to all obligors concerning the accuracy
of such disclosures. Thus, the general disclosure requirement of 15 U.S.C.A. §1631(a) is
not displaced by the single statement option of 15 U.S.C.A. §1631(b).
112. 15 U.S.C.A. §1640(a) (Supp. II 1976).
113. 12 C.F.R. §226.9(a),(f) (1976).
114. 537 F.2d at 883. But see Mason v. General Fin. Corp., 542 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1976).
115. The court in Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.
1976), remarked as follows on this question:
Furthermore, a holding that joint obligors could recover only one penalty would
create problems in administering the Act. For instance, if one obligor sued would
he be allowed the full penalty or only half of it? If granted the full penalty, could
the other obligor sue the winner for his half?
Id. at 883.
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amendment the problems surrounding Board staff opinions and
the good faith defense."' It is time for further action to resolve
these other ambiguities and disagreements.
116. Act of Feb. 27, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, §3(b), 90 Stat. 197 (1976).
